Tuesday, September 22, 2009
Sector rotation
The volume of commentary calling for a correction (orderly or otherwise) is growing. While on one hand it meaningless noise, it does add to a general sense of foreboding. Longs are happy to sit on their hands, though the ripcord is never far from reach.
For mine, the Dec XJO puts I bought on this run up are still in play - on balance, I'm expecting a pullback to around the various moving averages around 4550. I'll trade against the Mar XJO puts if we get some meaningful volatility heading into the new year.
One shape in the charts that has caught my eye are the defensives. There is a general bid against some of these stocks that suggests that a rotation into these types of stocks could be in the offing. That would fit with a retracement scenario where investors take profit but look to stay in the market.
Have a look at TCL for example. It held the $4.00 level over recent weeks with rising volume and momentum divergence. It is testing its longer term downtrend. Think I'll look to pick some up over next week if it breaks higher (near term target $4.70)...
Thursday, September 3, 2009
Steel as a proxy for BHP
One answer may be that steel producers that would otherwise export product may get government assistance to reignite their export markets. Consider for example, the announcement on 8 June 2009 that the government will refund the 9% value-added tax rebate on exports of several high-end steel products. This is aimed at effectively undercutting the pricing of Posco in its own market (South Korea was the biggest importer of Chinese steel).
3) China will gain pricing power – China’s steel industry struggles against persistent overcapacity (it produced 500mt in 2008 against a capacity at the time of around 600mt) that is spread across a plethora (72) of small and mid-sized producers. This creates an industry that is particularly vulnerable to demand and supply shocks. The flipside to the recent fiscally inspired boom is that once it is has passed, producers need to be weaned off the assistance. In an environment where export markets are particularly hard to find, it’s not surprising to hear reports of rapid stockpiling.
If you add into the mix that China’s producers operate on relatively thin average margins of around 5.5% (according to IMF working paper “Is China’s Export Oriented Export Growth Sustainable Aug-09) then there are all the ingredients for consolidation of the industry if it comes under stress. Hence, the statement from the China Mining Association that the industry lost money in the first four months of this year has special resonance. If you don’t believe me, have a look to the CISA for the direction that this is taking:
From China Steel and Iron Association on 31 July, 2009 – Secretary General of CISA suggested that steel makers accept a single ore price…to regulate excess ore shipments by small steel makers and intermediary traders, which have hampered negotiations by creating unnecessary demand.
(And for a little bit more colour on industry consolidation China style have a quick look at the state sponsored takeover of Rizhao Iron & Steel by Shandong Iron & Steel.)
In summary, this doesn’t sound like a glowing endorsement of a financial model that suggests 20% per annum growth in volumes over the next 3 years as well as rising prices. As a litmus test for the investment thesis, it’s coming up red (or is it purple?).
What this discussion does throw into stark relief is the implicit reliance that world economic growth has on that red-lacquered flight-box China. The accepted wisdom is that we can rely on China to continue to grow at 8% per annum – cause without this there will be rioting and pillaging on its streets. There’s bound to be some truth in the myth, but as with all things, the truth is a whole lot more complicated. My take on it is that China may well continue to grow at 8% per annum, but in the current environment this may not translate to higher prices, perhaps not even higher volumes, for the likes of BHP.
I know this has been rather long but couldn’t leave the following out as I think steelprices-china.com summarises the current market with a certain panache…
The main reason of arousing price decline is that traders and speculators’ selling lead to low market expectation. Because of the overcapacity, once the downstream demand fluctuates, it will increase the stock. According to the present, the steel stock will still increase in few weeks.”
The report then goes on to point out how critical the recovery in the US is….
More and more professionals believe that market risk is increasing. Steel enterprises, traders and end users all think that it will have a big change on September in China’s steel market. There is an important mark is that the change of American economic data in third quarter as American economic recovery is the prerequisite of the global economic recovery. If American economic indicator of third quarter is improved, it will be a huge inspiration to Chinese economy even the whole world. Demand of steel and steel price will increase. Otherwise, the steel price will drop severely.
Sunday, August 30, 2009
Copper and BHP
The crux of our pitch was that with World GDP growth expected to fall towards 2%, metals prices were going to take a hit. Following is a chart of GDP and copper prices since 1990 (source: IMF):

See the Asian crisis? It’s easy to miss given the more recent gyrations. It begs the question – how can copper prices (and commodity prices generally) continue to levitate at current levels in the face of such widespread demand destruction?
Now clearly the world has changed a great deal since the Asian crisis. The desperately low copper prices of the late 90’s and early noughties were the catalyst for consolidation and restructuring on the production side of the ledger. Producers now have greater pricing power. On the consumer side, the emergence of China into full throttle industrialisation logically puts a flaw under medium term demand. BHP sees China doubling its annual demand from current levels by 2025.
To get a sense of the demand and supply equation consider the following table:
There are a couple of things that jump out from this breakdown. The first being the absolute dominance of China, the second being that ‘high income’ countries (to use IMF vernacular) in aggregate remain significant to world demand.
Which leads to the obvious question – if there was a surplus in 2008, then what happens in 2009 when world GDP really falls off the edge (annualised Q1 GDP in US down 6.4%, Germany down 6.7%, Japan down 14.2%). Even if GDP has stabilised and (just maybe) begun to recover in the second half, it is now coming from a low base. Think we can reasonably expect the copper surplus to persist this year.
And going forward into 2010, even if China’s physical demand were to level out at a higher level (say 2 million tonnes per annum) if world GDP grows by 1% YOY after dropping 2.5% the year before, then there’s a reasonable chance that there will be a surplus for that calendar year as well.
So it’s a fair probability that for at least the short to medium term, physical demand for copper will be outstripped by supply.
How then can commodity prices be trading at their current levels? It’s not because the cost of production demands it (witness BHP’s current EBIT margins at around 40%, nearly double that of the dark days of the Asia crisis). Or put another way, who has been the marginal buyer pushing up prices beyond the physical demand for the metal. The answer not unexpectedly is China. The following chart of refined copper imports in China illustrates the point. (Source: China Customs Office)

Impressive isn’t it. The fact is China has been sucking in copper above and beyond its current needs. Macquarie estimates as much as 400,000 tonnes have been stockpiled in the first half. While there have been reports that China has bought 235,000 tonnes for its strategic reserves.
So will stockpiling continue?
As with all things China it is hard to get definitive, but a couple of arguments would suggest not.
Firstly, logic would suggest China does not need to chase the price higher. The whole point about building strategic reserves in a very weak market is to facilitate management of supply when demand picks up. With around 40% of their annual import requirements covered by stockpiles, China’s consumers can afford to be a little less hasty in bidding for supplies even if they are for additional reserves.
Secondly, indications are that liquidity is being reined in. Statements about the reclassification of sub-debt in relation to bank reserves and about how the proceeds of loans should be applied suggest anecdotally (if not in substance) that the Party is concerned about liquidity-fuelled speculation. The fall in new lending in July mirrors the decline in copper imports. Early indications are that liquidity and its handmaidens, greed and lust, are on the wane.
To BHP then – what is its valuation looking like with the share price over $37? Consensus forecasts look something like:

The commodity assumptions underlying these earnings are many and varied depending upon the broker. But as a generalisation on a straw poll, they are pretty much extrapolations of current prices continuing to strengthen from here (UBS for example has forecasts for copper of 223 cents per pound for FY2010 and 255 cents in FY011 - compared to a realised price of 224 cents in FY2009).
In short, I’d class the current valuation as pretty rich. While the long term Chindia industrialisation story remains favourable, as with all things, this fundamental outlook should be risk weighted to reflect the many uncertainties in our world. At 15x to 20x earnings, and on the basis that these earnings are calculated using favourable commodity prices, there is not much room for error (or upside).
On the other hand, maybe we are living on the verge of an inflationary world where the USD will plummet, commodity prices will soar, and China will lead us into another era of excess and fine dining. Maybe…
Monday, August 17, 2009
Under the pump - close-out QBE
Tuesday, August 11, 2009
CEU traffic update and other buys
Friday, August 7, 2009
Moving on for greener pastures
Monday, August 3, 2009
Switched out of WBC and into QBE
Wednesday, July 29, 2009
ALZ - On reflection...I'm a buyer at 40 cents
Tuesday, July 28, 2009
Australand - buy into rights issue?
| 30/6/08 | 30/6/09 | |
| Investment Portfolio value | $2,288 | $2,015 |
| Weighted avg lease expiry | 6.6 | 6.4 |
| Avg cap rate | 7.54% | 8.34% |
| Avg cap rate - office | 7.28% | 7.91% |
| Avg cap rate - industrial | 7.75% | 8.81% |
| Occupancy (incl rent support) | 98.80% | 99.10% |
| Reported invt portfolio value | 2015.0 |
| Reported avg cap rate | 8.34% |
| Implied rental income | 168.1 |
| Assume cap rate +1% | 9.34% |
| Implied portfolio value | 1799.3 |
| Change in value | 215.7 |
| Covenant impact | 37% |
| 10% decline in devpt assets | 143.8 |
| Total Covenant impact | 39% |
| DPS yield | Discount to NTA | |
| Australand | 10.30% | 43.50% |
| Stockland | 6.80% | 12.30% |
| Mirvac | 7.10% | 24.80% |
| GPT | 7.50% | 27.80% |
| C'wealth Office | 8.50% | 38.40% |
| Dexus | 8.50% | 38.60% |
Sunday, July 26, 2009
Not drowning, waving
The Woman's Day approach to investing
Wednesday, July 22, 2009
Small XJO short as a trading hedge and selling CEU
Tuesday, July 21, 2009
Stocks for review (comments welcome)...
| Technology | Financials | Industrial | ||
| ISS Group | QBE | Leightons | ||
| IRESS | Westpac | RCR Tomlinson | ||
| Wotif | CBA | Worleys | ||
| Seek | Macquarie | Hastie | ||
| Reckon | APN Property Group | HGL | ||
| GBST | ||||
| Praemium | Retail | Media | ||
| Fantastic Furniture | Mitchell Comm's | |||
| Property | The Reject Shop | Photon Group | ||
| Australand | SuperCheap | STW Communications | ||
| Goodman | JB Hi Fi | Austar | ||
| Westpac Office | Wesfarmers | Newscorp | ||
| Bunnings Property | Metcash | |||
| Healthcare | ||||
| Infrastructure | Energy | Cochlear | ||
| Connect-East | AWE | Biota | ||
| Transurban | Beach Petroleum | CSL | ||
| Envestra | Karoon Gas | Neuren | ||
| Deuts | Woodside | Blackmores | ||
| Viridis | Paladin | |||
| ERA | Telecom | |||
| Resources | MEO Australia | IINet | ||
| BHP | PIPE Networks | |||
| Newcrest | Gaming | |||
| Orica | Tattersalls |
Wednesday, July 15, 2009
TTS - dodgy analysis
A short mea culpa before I go on. I bought TTS (13July09) on the back of some dated analysis and a, potentially, good looking chart. After running through the numbers I don’t think TTS is great value above $2.60. Still like the management. Just the broad numbers don’t suggest terrific upside from there without a meaningful win on some of the bids they are likely to lodge. Anyways, its all grist to the mill…on with where I have got to.
I subscribe to the theory – if the value isn’t obvious, or at least readily understood, then it’s probably missing. This is particularly true of financial models. I have been guilty of trying to build the million-variable model in my youth. No more.
So to a quick summary of my views on TTS. I’m going to simply extrapolate the Dec 08 half yearly result. I know there is some seasonality in their business – but for these purposes a straight line from the latest numbers will suffice.
My current take on TTS splits the overall business in two – 1) there are the steady state operations (Tatts Lotteries, Unitab, and MaxGaming) and 2) the run-off and growth potential (Tatts Pokies, the international operations and upcoming local opportunities).
In valuing the business I therefore assume there is a core business that is pretty easy to get a broad grip on. Take the following for example,
Dec-08 EBIT Unitab 71.3 Lotteries 46.5 MaxGaming 20.3 H/O costs -17.0 Group EBIT 121.1 Annualised 242.2 EBITmultiple 8 10 12 14 Valuation 1938 2422 2906 3391
You could argue the group EBIT is conservative – given it includes the corporate costs associated with Pokies as well – but this is an impressionist portrait.
Take your pick which EBIT multiple is appropriate for a business like TTS. From my perspective, I reckon 10 to 12 times would probably work (equivalent to P/E of around 15x). Gaming businesses typically command a reasonably high multiple (CWN trades in a P/E range of 15 to 20). On the flip side, state governments have been a tad unfriendly of late – so there should be compensation for the heightened regulatory risk.
Okay, that’s the ‘core operations’. How about the rest?
I think we can ignore the international for the moment. There is potential there – but nothing has come of this as yet and they have been at it a while. Let’s value these at zero then.
That gets us to the Tatts Pokies business. Let’s assume that the EBIT of $116m for the Dec08 half is replicated across the remaining term of the licence (6 half years). And let’s also assume that TTS is successful in extracting $600m from the government per the original licence agreement (the IPO prospectus assumed $598m). PV these back (I’ve assumed 7% - no particular reason, seems like a healthy premium to the risk free rate) and voila, you get a present value of $1,100m.
Finally, TTS had net debt of $734m at balance date. Capex of ~$45m was running just below depreciation of ~$50m – let’s assume it’s a wash.
So what have we got:
Core business $2,400 $2,900
Tatts pokies $1,100 $1,100
Less debt $ 730 $ 730
Market value $2,770 $3,270
Or, given 1,270m shares on issue, a share price between $2.20 and $2.60.
Conclusion – This analysis is clearly rough. It’s also probably conservative. And it doesn’t take into account upside from TTS winning new business – something I think the management is very capable of doing. But on the face of it, if I want to own TTS, better off waiting for a retest of the lows. I sold out of the position today.
Tuesday, July 14, 2009
XJO versus XAO
XJO to follow the US
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Defensives looking bid?
Monday, July 13, 2009
Long DUE and TTS
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Don't get me wrong, I'm still a bear on this market over the next 6 to 12 months (heck - I expect a breakdown in the commodities complex sooner than that). It's just that I like the look of defensives at the moment.
Sunday, July 12, 2009
That's whose been buying CEU
Wednesday, July 8, 2009
CEU - price strength in the face of poor traffic
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